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Abstract
We investigate the impact of banks disclosure on the evolution of their CDS spreads during the Eu-
ropean sovereign crisis. The disclosure of information helps investors in building expectations; disclosure
may participate into the reduction of the information risk premium and may lead to a decrease of CDS
spreads. We analyze the CDS spreads changes following the announcement of sovereign credit rating
downgrades. We consider 16 dates in the period 2011-2013 and, for each one, we assess the cumulative
abnormal CDS spread change (CASC). We build two disclosure indexes: one general and one specifically
dedicated to sovereign exposure. We show that the bank exposure to sovereign risk has a positive im-
pact on the CASC. Disclosure about sovereign exposure has a negative impact on CASC showing that
information reduce risk premiums. However, the global disclosure increases the CASC; investors may
disapprove the disclosure of too much abundant and broad information.
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1 Introduction
The European sovereign crisis during the early 2010s has raised major concerns about the solvability of
European banks. First, the increasing sovereign credit risk has a negative impact on the value of banks
portfolio. Furthermore, deeply in debt countries may not bail out banks in financial di culties. As domestic
banks are more likely to buy domestic sovereign debt the combined e ect of “no bailing out” and “higher risk”
assets can be harmful for the banking sector. At last, the lower value of sovereign bonds - collaterals for ECB
facilities - reduced the possibility of refunding and may lead to liquidity problems. For instance, Acharya et
al (2015) emphasize these di erent channels of di usion and their negative influence on credit supply. The
degradation of banks credit risk conducts to variations in the value of financial assets, e.g. to a decrease
in the value of the bonds they issued, and to an increase of the credit default swap (CDS) spread on these
bonds (For more details see for instance Hull et al., 2004). Investors may overreact at the announcement of
a sovereign credit risk downgrade, and lead to a too strong adjustment of the bond value or the CDS spread
by requiring an informational risk premium, especially when uncertainty is strong. The consequence is a
high volatility on financial markets, leading to a higher financial instability. However, this informational risk
premium can be reduced if investors are well informed, for instance if the issuer discloses information (see
Baumann and Nier, 2004 or Akhigbe and Martin, 2008). As a consequence, another important issue of the
recent years concerns the disclosure of information to investors. Actually, the so-called “subprime crisis” has
enlightened the lack of transparency by banks and has led regulation authorities to review the international
agreement in order to restore and maintain stability in the banking sector. For this purpose, the European
Central Bank (ECB) and the European Banking Authority (EBA) organized stress tests to prepare banks to
extreme scenarios and to help them reacting to emergency situations1. The first stress-testing exercise was
done in 2009 with 22 participants and none of the results nor the identity of the participants were disclosed.
After that, EBA and the ECB decided to disclose the results and the data used for the two following resilience
tests. The second and third stress tests were led in 2010 and 2011, and their results published in the same
year. Petrella and Resti (2013) and Bishof and Daske (2013) show that these stress tests actually provided
new information to financial markets. To face the sovereign crisis, the EBA also led Capital Exercises,
in 2011 and in 2012. Their aim was to review banks sovereign exposure and to control the adequacy of
their capital to this risk. The EBA disclosed the results of these exercises in 2011 and 2012. Furthermore,
disclosure also plays an important role in the banking regulation, as the Basel III Pillar 3 (and Basel II Pillar
3 before it) emphasizes, in order to increase banks resilience (See Frolov, 2007). The governance codes of the
listed firms also require disclosure, for instance with the principles of pay on say or comply or explain. The
banks themselves have increased their disclosure towards investors and public, in order to satisfy a growing
1The objective of the EU’s stress testing exercises of the banking sector is the assessment of whether banks will maintain an
adequate level of capitalization even when facing an exogenous shock.
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demand for transparency. The aim of this article is to analyze whether disclosure by banks plays a role in
the investors reaction during the European sovereign crisis. We analyze the relationship between disclosure
by banks and their credit default swaps (CDS) spreads from 2011 to 2013. We focus on the reaction of CDS
spread when the credit rating of a European country has been downgraded. The disclosure of information by
the banks should reduce the informational risk premium, and, as a consequence, disclosure should reduce the
reaction of the CDS market. We consider two kinds of disclosure: first, we consider disclosure of information
about sovereign risk exposure in order to know whether investors more or less react when they have access
to such information than when they do not. Second, we consider disclosure of general information (such as
corporate governance), because a strategy of global disclosure may create confidence: if investors have access
to general information they may react less than if they do not. This question is important from a regulatory
point of view: does disclosure increase financial stability? Is disclosure a key of the market discipline on
the financial markets? The policy implications are important: If disclosure acts like an enhancer of stability
over the CDS spreads, the recommendations and the decisions to increase the mandatory level of disclosure
coming from banks have provided beneficial output. We use the data obtained from the European Banking
Authority in order to know the banks exposure to sovereign risk: results of the capital exercises in 2011 and
2012 are considered. We assess the impact of downgrading sovereign credit ratings on the evolution of the
CDS spreads. We calculate cumulative variations of spread above a CDS index. Then we analyze the role
played by banks’ disclosure on the CDS spread reactions, when controlling for bank sovereign exposure to the
countries included in the EBA capital exercise. We used a ordinary least square model with correction for
heteroskedasticity. We show that specific disclosure reduces reactions of the CDS spreads, estimated by the
cumulative abnormal CDS spreads changes. Global disclosure has the opposite influence. We also show that
banks in the Eurozone are more likely than non-eurozone banks to see their CDS spreads increasing during
this period. This article provides several contributions. First, we analyze the role of disclosure by banks
when a sovereign downgrading is announced whereas only the impact of disclosure by the EBA has already
been analyzed (see Petrella and Resti, 2013, or, in the US context, Neratina et al., 2014). The role played
by the banks as information providers during the EMU crisis has not been analyzed before. Second, we
create a new disclosure index based on yearly reports of banks. The index rewards banks that are the most
transparent. Third, we use the results of the capital exercises, whereas only the results of the EBA stress-
tests have been exploited (for instance by Petrella and Resti, 2013 or Ellahie, 2012). Our last originality
comes with the use of the bank CDS instead of equities or bonds, as used by most empirical literature related
to disclosure. Actually, a growing financial literature shows the CDS spreads provide relevant information.
Hull et al (2004) argue that CDS spreads are more reliable than bonds spreads; Delatte et al (2012) show
that during stress periods, information are transmitted from CDS market to bonds market. The article will
be divided as follows. The section 2 presents the background, reviewing the existing literature on with our
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article lies. Section 3 describes the empirical strategy and the data set. Statistics about the variables and the
downgrading events are given in section 4. Section 5 presents our empirical findings, including robustness
checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Background
Our article relies on two fields of literature. The first one is about the link between bank disclosure and
financial stability; the second one focuses on the bank resilience during the European crisis.
2.1 Bank disclosure and financial stability
A growing literature analyzes the impact of disclosure on financial stability. Most of the literature studies the
impact of bank disclosure on stock markets. Baumann and Nier (2004) show that the stock prices volatility
is decreased by disclosure. Their results suggest that disclosure is useful to investors because it reduces
the rumor e ect and participates into the reduction of unwanted volatility. Akhigbe and Martin (2008)
also find a negative relationship between disclosure and volatility. They show that disclosure decreases the
individual risk and the total risk even if it has no e ect on the systematic risk2. Tadesse (2006) focuses on
the impact of the introduction of mandatory disclosure on banking stability. He shows that the quantity and
quality of disclosure reduce the probability of occurrence of a systemic banking crisis. The importance of
disclosure for bank solvability, and for banking sector stability, has also been emphasized. This aspect can
play a role, even indirect, in the perception of bank credit risk by investors. Vauhkonen (2011) shows that
information disclosure has a positive impact on bank safety. In a model of banking competition in which
the bank probability of continuing its activity depends on the quality of its risk management, mandatory
disclosure (e.g. Basel II Pillar 3) fosters bank’s quality competition, and avoids behaviors which could be
harmful to the financial market stability. Cordella and Yeyati (2002) also study the impact of disclosure on
bank risk taking, via the control exerted by depositors. Banks have an incentive to improve the quality of
their portfolio and to become less risky when the monitoring of the bank is possible. Informed depositors
participate to an increase in stability through the modification of the risk management. Cordella and Yeyati
(1998) are more qualified. They show that if banks do not chose the risk of their assets (because of systematic
issues for instance), banks disclosure may increase their probability of default. Studying US banks, Neratina
et al. (2014) show that the disclosure of the stress-tests results decreases the CDS spreads and, in the long
term, reduces the systematic risk: disclosure may lead to a lower risk taking and a lower systemic risk.
2For more details about the impact of disclosure on financial markets, see for instance Farvaque et al. (2011).
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2.2 Sovereign debt exposure and bank resilience during EMU crisis
A recent literature analyzes the relationship between sovereign risk and banking risk during the recent
European sovereign crisis. Grammatikos and Vermeulen (2012) show that a transmission of sovereign risk to
the financial markets (to bonds and stocks of financial firms) starts after the Lehman collapse. A group of
articles focuses on the link between sovereign CDS and bank CDS. Arnold (2012) shows that the sovereign
risk has a positive impact on banking risk during the first phase of the crisis in 2010. He shows that the
more banks are exposed to distressed sovereign debt the more their stock returns and their CDS spreads
respond to a change in sovereign CDS rates. However, this reaction appears to be driven by fixed e ects
on banks located in the in crisis countries (ICC: Spain, Ireland, Greece and Portugal). Banks in these
countries appear more vulnerable to sovereign risk either directly due to their exposure to domestic debt
or indirectly by the impossibility of government to bail them out, increasing the risk of default of bank.
Actually, Acharya et al. (2014) show that financial sector bailouts and sovereign credit risk are intimately
linked: the announcement of financial sector bailouts was associated with an immediate opening of sovereign
CDS spreads, while the banks’ one were becoming more and more narrow. After the bailout, however, a
significant co-movement between bank CDS spread and sovereign CDS spread is visible. However, Alexandre
and Wang (2015) obtain more qualified results: co-movements between sovereign CDS spread and banks CDS
spread are only significant in Belgium and in Greece. De Bruyckere et al. (2013) also study the contagion in
the European debt crisis from sovereign debt to banks over the period 2006-2011. Contagion between bank
and sovereign credit risk (defined as an excess of correlation between CDS spread of banks and sovereign
CDS spread) exists especially at the emergence of the debt crisis in 2009 (significant spillovers for 86% of the
banks of the sample). An important channel of contagion holds on a strong home bias in banks exposure.
A second group of articles focuses on the information provided by the stress-tests. Petrella and Resti (2013)
analyze the impact of supervisors tests as an information tool on banks stock prices in 2011. The abnormal
returns of bank stock prices are strongly correlated to their output, meaning that stress-tests reveal new
information. Their results are consistent with Morgan et al. (2014) in an US context: stress-tests provide
information on the gap between the required capital and the banks capital, as shown by an event study on
stock market. However Ellahie (2012), in line with microstructure theory, shows that stress-tests in 2010 and
2011 may increase information asymmetry on financial markets. At least Bischof and Daske (2013) study the
consequences of supervisory disclosure of bank specific information such as credit risk exposure and stress-test
simulations. They analyze how mandatory supervisory disclosures interact with banks’ subsequent voluntary
disclosures or opaqueness. Their results show a substantial rise in voluntary disclosure on sovereign credit
risk exposure from 2009 to 2011. The general pressure of investors, auditors, regulators or rating agencies
to provide such specific disclosure increased with the severity of the Eurozone debt crisis.
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2.3 Testable hypotheses
The purpose of this article is to analyze whether or not disclosure increases stability on the CDS market.
When a sovereign credit risk increases, the consequences are twofold: first, the value of the assets owned
by the bank decreases; second the value of the collateral banks can provide to the ECB for a refunding
decreases, and may lead to liquidity problems. Thus, banks credit risk may be deteriorated and their CDS
spread will increase too3. The consequence is greater when the bank is located in the downgraded country,
because the ability of the State to bail out banks is reduced. If the investors are rational and well informed,
the increase for a bank is proportional to its exposure to sovereign risk. Sovereign debt exposure is supposed
to have a positive impact on the CDS spreads. As sovereign risk has an important systematic component
(see for instance Longsta  at al., 2007) their reaction may also be linked to the exposure to other weakened
countries.
A change in the banks’ CDS spread is not only explained by a change in the risk premium but also in
the informational risk premium. We assume that disclosure has stability e ect over the CDS spreads: More
disclosed information reduce the uncertainty, and therefore the informational risk premium. So the disclosure
of information reduces the CDS spread of the banks when the signal emitted is able to reassure investors. By
disclosing information regularly, a bank can smooth the market reaction to new information. If investors have
a good knowledge of bank exposure, their reaction to an announcement of sovereign downgrading will be lower
because the informational risk premium will be lower. Thus, we assume that the information disclosed by
the bank on its sovereign exposure have a negative impact in the evolution of the CDS spreads. Furthermore,
banks can provide other kind of information than the one related to sovereign exposure. These information
may have an impact on the investors reaction by creating confidence (Coates, 2007), and reducing the risk
premium. We also assume that global disclosure (not related to sovereign debt) has a negative impact in
the reaction of the CDS spreads.
3 Data and empirical methodology
The following paragraph presents the sample and the dataset. Then, we introduce the 16 events we consider
for our analysis. At last, we explain our empirical strategy, and we describe the dependent variables and the
independent variables: disclosure by the bank, exposure to sovereign risk and control variables.
3.1 Sample and dataset
Our study focuses on the European banks that have participated to the capital exercises in 2011 and 2012,
in order to use the information given in their reports: the exposure to sovereign risk and the RWA (risk
3The literature shows that the CDS spread actually raises whan the credit risk increases, see for instance Annaert et al.
(2013)
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weighted assets). 79 banks ran the exercise in 2011, and 61 banks in 2012. To have the same sample over
the global period, we only consider the 59 banks that ran the exercises both in 2011 and 2012. Furthermore,
we must focus on the banks with CDS emitted in their name. Our sample contains the 47 banks respecting
these three conditions. We also use Bloomberg and Bankscope (from Bureau Van Dijk) databases. The
Bloomberg database provides the CDS spreads. Bankscope provides the accounting data and information
about tier one capital. We build banks disclosure indexes on the analyses of their financial reports. The
sample contains large international banks such as the Deutsche Bank, which has the largest total asset of
our sample (more than 2,655,138 million USD). Our sample includes other large banks such as BNP Paribas,
Cr_dit Agricole or HSBC. On the other hand the bank with the smallest amount of assets the Banco Pastor
with only 39,301 million USD. The average size of total assets is 697,663 millions USD. The geographical
distribution of banks among Europe is rather uniformly distributed but gives a higher representativeness to
German, Italian and Spanish banks. The largest banks are located in France, UK and Germany. 37 banks
over the 47 are located in the Eurozone, and 14 banks over 47 are located in Portugal, Ireland, Greece or
Spain (In crisis countries).
3.2 Events: Sovereign credit risk downgrades
We use the Europress.com database to determine the exact date of each downgrade by Standard & Poor’s,
Moody’s, and Fitch. The ratings agencies announced more than 65 sovereign downgrades over the period
January 2011 to June 2013 in the European Union. The choice of the period is justified by the fact that
the results of the EBA capital exercises are only known since 2011. The di erent rating agencies even
announced several downgrades on the same day, reducing the 65 announcements to 56 dates. We consider
a restricted number of downgrades in order to focus on the main events. We consider three di erent kinds
of event: first when the magnitude of the downgrade is at least equal to three, second when a triple A
country is downgraded (even if the magnitude is below 3), and finally when at a single date there is more
than one country downgraded. By choosing only the events that have a larger magnitude, we eliminate
the downgrades that are considered as adjustments4. By choosing to incorporate AAA countries that are
su ering from a downgrade of their sovereign debt rating, we ensure that we take into account other countries
and not only Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain. Choosing to incorporate the downgrade of France, the
United Kingdom or other AAA countries, allows us to analyze sovereign debt that used to be considered
as “risk free”. The investors can consider the lost of a triple A as important as a downgrade of magnitude
3. We also integrate an event with more than one downgrade on the same day. In January 13th, 2012
S&P downgraded 9 European countries. Those downgrades are the answer from S&P to European policy
4The downgrade of a country can be interpreted as an adjustment when the country is in a situation where its economic
forecast will not be fulfill. For example: if Spain economics forecast is supposed to be negative, and 6 months after the
rating agency downgrades the sovereign debt; then this downgrade is considered as an adjustment because it is supposed to be
anticipated.
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makers, judging that their initiatives taken in the previous weeks may be insu cient to fully address ongoing
systemic stresses in the Eurozone. The list of events is now up to 16 dates around which we conduct our
study. The events we selected cover the following period: From January 1st 2011 and to June 30 2013.
3.3 Empirical methodology and variables description
We analyze the evolution of CDS spreads of banks over the period 01/03/2011 to 06/30/2013. Our sample
contains 742 observations: 47 banks over 16 events. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal
spread change (CASC) of CDS in order to measure the reaction of the market to a downgrading in sovereign
credit ratings. For each event, and for each bank, we determine the CASC over di erent windows: from
5 days before the event to 5 days after the event; from 2 days before the event to 2 days after the event.
We also use post event windows: 5 days after the event and 2 days after the event. The choice of several
windows allows us to analyze more in details the reaction of the CDS spreads, and to check the robustness
of our results (see MacKinlay, 1997 or De Bruyckere, 2012). The empirical model estimates the relationship
between the CASC and four di erent groups of independent variables (see below). These variables assess
the sovereign disclosure (SOVEREIGN DISCLOSURE), the global disclosure (GLOBAL DISCLOSURE),
the exposure to sovereign risk (SOVEREIGN EXPOSURE) and control variables (CONTROL). The model
we run can be summarized as:
CASCTb,≠i,+j = –+ —1SOV EREIGN DISCLOSUREb,T + —2GLOBAL DISCLOSUREb,T (1)
+—3SOV EREIGN EXPOSUREb,T + —4CONTROLb,T + Áb,T
where T is the date of the event and b is the bank, i the number of days we observe the CDS spread
before the event and j the number of days we consider the CDS spread after the event. The White’s
General Heteroskedasticity Test was particularly significant for the global disclosure and for the exposure to
Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece. The model we run is an OLS corrected for heteroskedasticity using a
heteroskedasticity - consistent covariance matrix estimator. In a first step, we run an OLS estimation of the
model. Then, in a second step, we estimate the error variance by regressing the log of the squared residuals
from the OLS on the regressors and their squares. Then in the last step, we run a weighted least squares,
using the reciprocal of the estimated variance as weight. We tested the existence of non-linear links between
the dependent variables and the independent variables but it was not statistically significant; consequently
we only use linear specifications.
3.3.1 Dependent variables
The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal variation of the CDS spreads, following the announcement
of a downgrade of sovereign credit rating. Following Norden and Weber (2004), we first assess use the
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abnormal CDS spread change (ASC). The ASCb,t for the bank b at time t is the di erence between the
daily variation of the CDS spread and the daily variation of a CDS market Index (the SNRFIN CDSI GEN
5Y published by iTraxx). The choice of this broad index rather than a European CDS index allows to limit
the over representation of the European sovereign debt crisis in the index and reduces the country-specific
e ects. Then, we compute a cumulative abnormal CDS spread change (CASC):
CASCTb,≠i,+j =
T+jÿ
t=T≠i
(CDSspread(b,t) ≠ CDSindext) (2)
where T is the date of the event, b the bank, i the number of days we observe the CDS spread before the
event and j the number of days we consider the CDS spread after the event. For each one of the 16 events,
and for each bank, we determine the CASC over four di erent windows in the neighborhood of the date of
the event: CASCTb,≠5,+5, CASCTb,≠2,+2, CASCTb,0,+5, CASCTb,0,+2.
3.3.2 Disclosure variables
We consider two kinds of disclosure: disclosure about sovereign exposure and global disclosure. We build
the two variables on the basis of the financial reports of each participating bank for the year 2010 and 2011.
The yearly financial reports are usually published during the month of March for the previous year. This
information allow us to cover our whole set of events from early 2011 to mid 2013. The financial reports of
2010 are used to define our disclosure index from early 2010 till March 2012. The financial reports of 2011
give the disclosure index of 2012 till the first quarter of 2013. We build a disclosure index about sovereign
exposure with di erent elements. First, we consider the number of times the word “sovereign” is pronounced
in each financial report (Times). In order to have a normed indicator, we assess Times by dividing the
number of times for each bank by the maximal number provided by a bank (the greatest disclosure).
T imes = time theword sovereign is pronounced b,nmax time theword sovereign is pronounced (3)
where b is the bank b and n=2010, 2011.
We also consider the number of pages devoted to sovereign risk (Pages). In order to have a normed indicator,
we assess Pages by dividing the number of pages for each bank by the maximal number provided by a bank
(the greatest disclosure).
Pages = number of pages dedicated to sovereign exposure b,nmax number of pages dedicated to sovereign exposure (4)
where b is the bank b and n=2010, 2011.
We also consider the quality of disclosure devoted to sovereign exposure. Quality is measured by a 100% to
0% scale. In order to obtain the maximum grade, here 100%, the financial report must provide graphical
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analysis, charts, figures and must be easy to find in the report (typically if the sovereign exposure is easy to
find across the summary or the table of content). The bank gets a grade of 66,66% if no graphical analysis
if provided, gets a grade of 33,33% if it not easy to find in the report, and a grade of 0% if not reported or
poorly reported.
We calculate a sovereign disclosure index (Sovereign Disclosure) that takes into account the three previous
components.
Sovereign Disclosure =Mean (T imes, Pages, Quality) (5)
We build a second disclosure index, Global Disclosure. It integrates several subcomponents, listed in the
table 1, concerning the global policy of disclosure by each bank. We consider the size of the financial reports
(in pages), the presence or absence of the Basel II Pillar 3 (B2P3) annexes, the presence of information
about the remuneration of the decision maker (number of pages devoted to the say on pay), the presence
of information about the bank compliance with national or supranational rules of governance (comply or
explain), the presence of information about the majority shareholder, the presence of noticeable shareholders
(holding more than 3% of the capital) and finally the presence of information about the attendance of board
members to meetings. For the two variables based on the number of pages, we transform both variables into
dummy variables, equal to 1 if the number of pages is above the median of the sample, 0 otherwise. For the
five other variables, we use dummy variables that reward disclosure: for example, if the financial report of
a bank gives information about the attendance of boards members to meeting the value of this variable will
be 1, and 0 otherwise. Global Disclosure is computed by cumulating the value of each component divided
by 7, so its value is between 0 and 1.
Sovereign Disclosure and Global disclosure are expected to have a negative impact on CASC.
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Table 1: Global disclosure index
Variable name Meaning Value
Financial Report Size 1 if above median0 otherwise
B2P3 Appendix Presence or not of the appendix
1 if appendix is provided on website or
in report
0 otherwise
Say On Pay Number of pages devoted todirectors remuneration
1 if above median
0 otherwise
Comply Or Explain Presence or not of informationabout compliance with the
governance code
1 if provided in the financial report
0 otherwise
Majority Shareholder Presence or not of information inthe report
1 if provided in the financial report
0 otherwise
Noticeable Shareholder Presence or not of information inthe report
1 if provided in the financial report
0 otherwise
Member’s Attendance
to Board Meeting
Presence or not of information in
the report
1 if provided in the financial report
0 otherwise
3.3.3 Sovereign exposure per bank
The capital exercises conducted by the EBA in 2011 and 2012 disclose the sovereign exposure of each
participating bank per country. The exercises provide these exposures for 3 di erent times: 31st, December
2010, 31st, December 2011 and 30th, June 2012. For each date, the EBA gives information about the
amount, the maturity and the type of sovereign risk held by the bank for each country. We compute nine
di erent variables. For each event, we consider the exposure to the country concerned by the downgrade,
but also the exposure to the other European countries. Actually, as shown by Longsta  et al. (2007), the
sovereign risk contains an important systematic component: following the increase of credit risk in a country,
investors may anticipate an increase of credit risk in the other European countries. The first variable is the
total exposure of each bank towards all the countries concerned of the EBA stress tests, divided by the total
assets of the bank, in order to control the size e ect (Relative Exposure). The expected sign of this variable
on the evolution of the spread of the CDS is positive. The second variable is the total exposure towards the
all in crisis countries (ICC Exposure) in order to identify banks that are exposed to the riskier sovereign
debts. The third variable assesses the exposure of each bank to countries that su ered from a downgrade over
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the period 01/01/2011 to 06/30/2013 (Downgrade Exposure). So this variable does not take into account
the exposure towards Germany, Luxembourg, Sweden and Norway. The last 6 variables consider the specific
exposure (gross or net) of the country or countries that were downgraded at the date of the event. Short
Term Gross Exposure (from 0 to 3 months), Medium Term Gross Exposure (from 3 months to 1 year), Long
Term Gross Exposure (from 1 year to 5 years) express the gross exposure towards the country/countries
su ering the downgrade for each event. Short Term Net Exposure, Medium Term Net Exposure and Long
Term Net Exposure express the net exposure towards the country su ering the downgrade for each event.
In the case of the event of 12th, January 2012, we add up the exposure data for each country that were
a ected by the di erent downgrades (nine in total). Each of these variables is expected to a ect positively
the cumulative abnormal CDS spread changes.
3.3.4 Control variables
First, we control whether the bank is located in the country a ected by the downgrade. Domestic equals
1 in this case, 0 otherwise. We expect this variable to have a positive impact on the CASCs, as a State
deeply in debt cannot easily provide financial support to the national banking sector. In order to take into
account the peculiar economic problems of Eurozone members, we consider EuroZone, equals to 1 if the bank
is located in a Euro member country, and 0 otherwise. Our sample is composed of 10 banks that are not
located in a Euro member country. Both expectations about the sign of this variable are possible. First, the
Eurozone variable may have a negative impact on CASCs, if CDS market participants anticipate that the
size and the strength of the institutions of the Eurozone ensure the stability of the all zone even in period
of trouble. Secondly, the Eurozone factor may have positive impact on CASCs, if CDS market participants
anticipate that the situation in the Eurozone is di cult enough that the stability cannot be ensure. ICC (In
Crisis Countries) takes the value 1 if the bank is located in one of the following country: Portugal, Ireland,
Greece and Spain, the four countries that benefited from a ECB emergency rescue plan during the period.
These countries are the less able to ensure the bail out process in case of default because of their high level
of debt. We expect this variable to have a positive impact on the CASCs. We also consider a cross variable
measuring the exposure to the ICC sovereign debt when the bank is located in one of those countries: the
variable ICCxICC Exposure. At last, to control the risk of the bank, we use the Risk-weighted asset (RWA)5.
RWA is expected to have a positive impact on the CASCs. We also consider Non Performing Loans, equal
to the percentage of non performing loans in the loans portfolio of a bank. A non performing loan is defined
as a sum of borrowed money upon which the debtor has not made his or her schedule payments for at least
90 days. This variable is supposed to have a positive impact over the CASCs.
5This asset calculation determines the level of capital requirement for a bank.
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4 Statistical analysis
4.1 CASCs statistical analysis
Table 2 reviews descriptive statistics about the CASC around the events, for the four windows we consider.
As expected, in average, the CASC is positive: announcements of a downgrading in sovereign credit risk lead
to an increase in the CDS spreads. The longer the window is, the higher the CASC is. Two interpretations
can be given. First, the investors on the CDS market do not (in average) correct their first reaction after two
days (as the means of CASC 0,+5 and CASC -5,+5 are higher than the means of CASC 0,+2 and CASC
-2,+2). Second, the investors on the CDS market may anticipate the downgrading, as in average, CASC
-5,+5 is higher than CASC 0,+5 and, in average, CASC -2,+2 is higher than CASC 0,+2. The standard
deviation is high, revealing heterogeneous reaction of CDS spreads.
Table 2: CASC - Descriptive statistics
CASC 0,+5 CASC -5,+5 CASC 0,+2 CASC -2,+2
MEAN 904.19 1644.10 459.85 760.20
STDEV 2047.20 3711.80 1036.70 1726.60
MEDIAN 84.41 155.55 41.06 63.80
Q1 200.23 271.23 -24.63 -44.89
Q3 1079.50 1820.20 530.94 885.47
MIN -898.86 -1665.00 -469.09 -789.17
MAX 12290.00 23119.00 6197.80 10375.00
In order to show the e ect before and after the downgrading, graphs 1, and 2 present the evolution of ASC
from 5 days before to 5 days after the announcement. We selected two downgrading. The 2nd of April 2011
corresponds to the downgrading of Portugal by Fitch, from A- to BBB+ (Graph 1). The 29th of November
2012 corresponds to the lost of the rate AAA by France (From Aaa to Aa1 by Moodys) We can observe
an increase of the abnormal spread changes starting at the date of announcement, or, more clearly, the day
after the announcement.
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Grah 1: Event 2nd of April 2011 - Donwgrading of Portugal credit rating
Graph 2: Event 29th of November 2012 - Lost of Aaa by France
4.2 Disclosure variables’ analysis
Table 3 reviews descriptive statistics about Sovereign Disclosure and Global Disclosure in 2010 and 2011, and
presents their evolution. The highest level of disclosure about sovereign exposure is 92% in 2010 obtained
by the Deutsche Bank, while the highest value in 2011 is equal to 88% obtained by Allied Irish Bank. The
evolution over the period is positive, after the rise of awareness all over Europe, and most largely all around
the world, about the European sovereign debt crisis: the average value is increasing by more than 16%
when its median is increasing by more than 30%. Five banks (Bayerische Landesbank, Caja de Ahorros
y Pensiones de Barcelona, Norddeutsche Landesbank, Rabobank Nederland and Swedbank) have an index
equal to 0 during the year 2010 and only one for the year 2011 (Danske Bank). The di erent participating
banks decided to explain throughout annual reports theirs exposure to the di erent European countries. On
the other hand, we can see an increase in the standard deviation translating a more heterogeneous behavior
among banks. Concerning the global disclosure variable, the assessment is somehow reverse. On average,
the level of global disclosure is reducing in 2011 compared to what it was in 2010, but the dispersion of the
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distribution is also reducing. The banks may reorient their communication on what matters the most at
a given period, deciding to communicate more on the sovereign and reducing their other disclosures. The
maximum level of global disclosure in 2010 is 75%, obtained by three banks (Allied Irish Bank, Barclays
and HSBC). In 2011, the maximum is still 75% and is obtained by two banks (Royal Bank of Scotland and
Commerzbank). In the mean time, the minimum value is 0% in both year obtained by the National Bank
of Greece in 2010 and in 2011.
Table 3: Disclosure variables - Descriptive statistics
2010 2011 Evolution
Sovereign
Disclosure
Global
Disclosure
Sovereign
Disclosure
Global
Disclosure
Sovereign
Disclosure
Global
Disclosure
MEAN 27.28% 41.48% 32.75% 39.72% 16.70% -4.45%
STDEV 24.90% 20.15% 26.49% 19.59% 6.02% -2.87%
MEDIAN 24.82% 37.5% 36.31% 37.5% 31.71% 0.00%
Q1 3.79% 25% 3.82% 25% 0.83% 0.00%
Q3 47.03% 62.5% 54.59% 56.25% 13.85% -11.11%
MIN 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
MAX 92% 75% 88% 75% -5.63% 0.00%
4.3 Sovereign exposure analysis
Table 4 presents statistics about the total exposure variables. The total exposure to sovereign risk (Total
Exposure = Relative Exposure x Total Assets) shows a negative evolution for the year 2012 compared to the
2011 situation. The evolution is ranged from 0% to -45%. The maximum is held by BNP Paribas for the year
2011 and by Unicredit for the year 2012. The minimum exposure fluctuates less by only a decrease of 5%.
The bank holding the smallest amount of sovereign debt is Irish Life and Permanent for the year 2012 and by
Banco Pastor for the year 2011. The decrease in the average exposure to ICC risk of the participating banks
is larger, but the dispersion of the distribution remains stable. Three banks decided not to hold any ICC
sovereign debt for the year 2011 and four banks for the year 2012. The maximum exposure is held by the
BBVA bank for both years. Concerning the last variable (Downgrade Exposure), the comments are similar:
both the average total exposure to the downgraded countries and the standard deviation are decreasing.
The maximum exposure is held by BNP Paribas in 2011 and in 2012. The negative evolution of the three
variables indicates that the ECB plan to reduce exposure to the countries that are under surveillance by the
ECB and the IMF was a success.
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Table 4: Total exposure variables - Descriptive statistics
Total Exposure (million EUR) ICC Exposure (million EUR) Downgrade Exposure (million EUR)
2011 2012 EVO 2011 2012 EVO 2011 2012 EVO
MEAN 37804.80 35120.06 -8% 6570.00 5379.47 -22% 23691.36 20963.39 -13%
STDEV 31512.95 26073.45 -21% 11698.00 11644.30 0% 25597.53 21445.29 -19%
MEDIAN 32445 30444.38 -7% 2608.00 2152.01 -21% 12347 9479.70 -30%
Q1 10123.75 9420.68 -7% 456.00 170.40 -62.6% 3964.75 4350.34 9%
Q3 58110.25 58250.66 0% 6982.00 4472.63 -36% 37711.50 31146.64 -21%
MIN 2553.00 2434.67 -5% 0.00 0.00 0% 0 0 0%
MAX 139661.00 96426.16 -45% 56514.00 53925.00 -5% 99189.00 70058.39 -42%
4.4 Control variables analysis
On average, only 9,04% of the banks have the same nationality that the downgraded country (Domestic).
Our sample is composed of 37 banks located in Euro-zone member country (EUROZONE); the ten other
banks are residents of the following countries: Denmark (1 bank), Norway (1 bank), United Kingdom (4
banks) and Sweden (4 banks). In the same time, our sample is composed of 14 banks located in countries
in crisis (ICC): Portugal (2 banks), Ireland (3 banks), Greece (2 banks) and Spain (7 banks). 17 banks are
not located in a country that has been downgraded during the period. Most of these banks are located in
“AAA” countries like Germany (7 banks), Netherlands (4 banks), Denmark (1 bank), Norway (1 bank) and
Sweden (4 banks) during the period from 01/01/2011 to 06/31/2013.
5 Results and comments
This section first presents the result of our main models. We analyze the impact of disclosure, of sovereign
exposure and of control variables. Then, we present robustness checks of our main results.
5.1 Disclosure and CDS market reaction
We run two regressions for each of the four windows surrounding the events (Tables 5&6). We consider in
the first column the gross exposure to sovereign risk, and we consider in the second column the net exposure
to sovereign risk. Sovereign Disclosure has a negative influence on the cumulative abnormal CDS spread
changes for each of our window and for both net and gross exposure. The results obtained are consistent with
our expectation: sovereign disclosure participates into the reduction of the value of CDS spreads. The results
are robust on the several windows. They confirm the results of the literature about the role of disclosure in
decreasing volatility in financial markets (see Baumann and Nier, 2004 or Akhigbe and Martin, 2008). On the
other hand, Global Disclosure increases the CASCs. Such result shows that investors worship more oriented,
specific, disclosure in their calculation of the risk premium. The disclosure of characteristics which are more
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in line with the current financial and economic situation are more likely to participate to the reduction of
the spreads of CDS. Specific disclosure is rewarded by investors in the value of the spread whereas global
disclosure, potentially judged vague, increases the spread. This result can also be linked to Ellahie (2012)
and the theoretical microstructure literature, showing that disclosure may increase asymmetric information
on the financial market, and lead to a higher risk premium. We rerun our main models (over the CASC
0,+5 and CASC -5 ,+5) in order to check if the investors are more sensitive to the quantitative dimension
information (number of pages for instance), or, at the contrary, to the qualitative dimension of information
(quality of the report for instance). We break up our disclosures indexes in order to separate the quantitative
dimension from the qualitative dimension. Results are given in table 7. The stability of our results show
that the investors take care about the subject of the disclosed information. They desire and reward both
higher quality and higher quantity of disclosure, if the information are about sovereign risk.
5.2 Sovereign exposure and CDS market reaction
The analysis of the role played by the banks exposure to sovereign risk provides several results. The total
exposure per asset ratio (Relative Exposure) has a significantly positive influence on the cumulative abnormal
CDS spread changes. The result is consistent with our expectations: the more a bank is implicated in the
sovereign debt market the more the increase of its CDS spreads is. Informed investors react to the amount
of global exposure to sovereign debt even if it is not directly concern by a downgrade. This result is robust
whatever the window is.
Investors also pay attention to the exposure to sovereign debt of countries in crisis. Actually, the ICC
exposure has a negative significant influence on the cumulative abnormal CDS spread changes. This result
is a bit surprising when we expect a bank to see its CDS spread increase more when the bank has a bigger
amount of exposure to countries in crisis. It can be explain with the nationality of bank holding sovereign
debt of countries in crisis not located in one of those countries. If a strong German bank holds a significant
amount of Italian sovereign debt, investors are less afraid of the situation because of the solvability of the
German government. In order to confirm the previous result, we see the impact on the evolution of CDS
spreads of the cross variable ICCxICC Exposure which is positive and significant. Such result indicates that
investors are more likely to revise positively their calculation about the CDS spread when the bank exposed
to ICC is located in one of the four countries. This result can be explained by the diminishing capacity of
those governments to ensure the stability of their banking sector due to their highly indebted situation. Our
results are in line with Arnold (2012). This article shows that the banks reactions to variations in sovereign
CDS spreads were higher when they were more exposed to sovereign risk, especially for banks in ICC.
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Table 5: Model estimation with CASC 0,+5 and CASC -5,+5
The full sample consists of 752 observations in 2011, 2012 and 2013. The dependent variables are the cumulative abnormal
spread changes over four di erent windows. Independent variables definitions are provided in paragraphe 3.3. They are all
present in the regressions. The OLS regressions are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. In parentheses
are the t- test values. ***, **,* indicate statistical significativity at the 1%,5% and 10% level respectively.
CASC 0,+5 CASC 0,+5 CASC -5,+5 CASC -5,+5
Type Of
Exposure
Gross Exposure Net Exposure Gross Exposure Net Exposure
const ≠1366.73***
(-14.42)
≠1192.84***
(-14.69)
≠2528.55***
(-14.11)
≠2618.83***
(-14.29)
Sovereign
Disclosure
≠263.41***
(-3.49)
≠224.39***
(-3.38)
≠515.55***
(-3.65)
≠530.95***
(-3.63)
Global Disclosure 1756.12***
(13.28)
1535.31***
(13.46)
3308.37***
(13.13)
3482.34***
(13.41)
Relative
Exposure
3954.3***
(6.38)
3427.6***
(6.46)
7184.41***
(6.25)
7318.81***
(6.35)
ICC Exposure ≠0.09***
(-8.09)
≠0.08***
(-8.54)
≠0.17***
(-8.24)
≠0.18***
(-8.41)
Downgrade
Exposure
0.01***
(7.24)
0.0093***
(6.67)
0.02***
(7.21)
0.02***
(6.74)
Short Term
Exposure
0.056*
(1.65)
≠0.02
(-0.49)
0.11*
(1.72)
≠0.08
(≠1.07)
Medium Term
Exposure
0.023
(0.83)
0.05*
(1.72)
0.03
(0.65)
0.11*
(1.74)
Long Term
Exposure
≠0.04**
(-2.24)
≠0.02
(-0.84)
≠0.08**
(-2.45)
≠0.02
(-0.41)
Domestic 318.40**
(2.20)
258.75**
(2.00)
705.75**
(2.51)
521.14*
(1.79)
Eurozone 668.44***
(11.58)
604.68***
(12.35)
1241.99***
(11.37)
1315.57***
(11.83)
ICC 3317.27***
(14.93)
3012.13***
(16.29)
6164.06***
(15.29)
6336.27***
(15.50)
ICCxICC
Exposure
0.03***
(3.11)
0.03***
(3.32)
0.06***
(3.42)
0.06***
(3.44)
Tier 1 ≠3.51e-06*
(-1.79)
≠2.49e-06
(-1.57)
≠6.66e-06*
(-1.78)
≠6.702e-06*
(-1.88)
RWA ≠9.242e-08
(-0.44)
≠1.06e-07
(-0.62)
≠1.65e-07
(-0.43)
≠2.212e-07
(-0.59)
Non Performing
Loans
≠2.52e-06
(-1.01)
≠2.34e-06
(-1.00)
≠5.07e-06
(-1.09)
≠5.51e-06
(-1.10)
R  0.62 0.62 0.61 0.61
Adjusted R  0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60
F(15. 477) 52.07 52.06 49.68 50.06
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 6: Model estimation with CASC 0,+2 and CASC -2,+2
The full sample consists of 752 observations in 2011, 2012 and 2013. The dependent variables are the cumulative abnormal
spread changes over four di erent windows. Independent variables definitions are provided in paragraphe 3.3. They are all
present in the regressions. The OLS regressions are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. In parentheses
are the t- test values. ***, **,* indicate statistical significativity at the 1%,5% and 10% level respectively.
CASC 0,+2 CASC 0,+2 CASC -2,+2 CASC -2,+2
Type Of
Exposure
Gross Exposure Net Exposure Gross Exposure Net Exposure
const ≠643.38***
(-14.24)
≠667.66***
(-14.63)
≠1157.66***
(-14.49)
≠1793.91***
(-10.77)
Sovereign
Disclosure
≠92.53**
(-2.48)
≠99.54***
(-2.66)
≠212.51***
(-3.26)
≠612.62***
(-4.32)
Global Disclosure 817.78***
(12.73)
838.06***
(13.11)
1484.44***
(13.04)
2298.84***
(11.09)
Relative
Exposure
1850.89***
(6.15)
1979.69***
(6.43)
3274.66***
(6.23)
6895.79***
(6.72)
ICC Exposure ≠0.046***
(-8.76)
≠0.047***
(-8.70)
≠0.08***
(-8.18)
≠0.11***
(-7.44)
Downgrade
Exposure
0.005***
(7.20)
0.01***
(6.95)
0.01***
(6.95)
0.01**
(2.39)
Short Term
Exposure
0.03*
(1.91)
≠0.01
(-0.46)
0.07***
(2.80)
≠0.12***
(-2.98)
Medium Term
Exposure
0.01
(0.80)
0.03**
(2.10)
0.02
(0.77)
0.03
(0.81)
Long Term
Exposure
≠0.02***
(-2.67)
≠0.01
(-0.99)
≠0.04***
(-3.03)
0.03
(1.35)
Domestic 238.63***
(2.94)
174.64**
(2.07)
372.63***
(2.84)
639.82***
(3.90)
Eurozone 336.55***
(12.24)
337.56***
(12.17)
586.62***
(12.03)
811.22***
(8.72)
ICC 1553.01***
(14.24)
1633.72***
(14.51)
2863.73***
(16.25)
3435.08***
(26.86)
ICCxICC
Exposure
0.02***
(3.96)
0.02***
(3.66)
0.03***
(3.18)
0.04***
(3.38)
Tier 1 ≠1.61e-06*
(-1.72)
≠1.56e-06*
(-1.77)
≠2.24e-06
(-1.32)
3.38e-06
(0.80)
RWA ≠1.05e-07
(-1.07)
≠7.63e-08
(-0.82)
≠1.29e-07
(-0.71)
≠2.60e-08
(-0.06)
Non Performing
Loans
≠1.32e-06
(-1.00)
≠1.34e-06
(-0.98)
≠2.10e-06
(-0.97)
8.53e-07
(0.15)
R  0.62 0.62 0.62 0.63
Adjusted R  0.60 0.61 0.61 0.62
F(15. 477) 53.19 54.38 53.88 56.25
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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The total exposure to countries that have been downgraded during the period (Downgrade Exposure) has
a significant positive influence on the cumulative abnormal CDS spread changes, which is consistent with
our hypothesis. (This result is robust whatever the window is). This result is important: investors react to
announcement of downgrade when banks hold sovereign debt that have been, or will be downgraded. The
investors are really sensitive to downgrades, whatever the country a ected by the event. The sovereign risk
is perceived as global (in line with Longsta  et al, 2007). This result is consistent with the fact that the
net and gross exposure for either short, medium and long term, do not always have a significant impact on
CASCs. It could be interpreted as the fact that the banks are not specifically a ected by one event for a
unique country.
More precisely, we observe that the short-term (and less strongly medium-term) exposure to the downgraded
country has, in general, a positive impact on the CACS, when the coe cient is significant. Event if this
result is not as robust as the others, it is consistent with our expectations: the investors anticipate loss for the
bank, a ecting its credit risk. However, the impact of the long-term exposure is negative when the coe cient
is significant. This result could mean that investors anticipate a resolution of the European sovereign crisis
in the long term.
5.3 Nationality, risk of the bank and CDS market reaction
The control variables also provide interesting results. The variable Domestic has a positive influence on the
CASCs. Such result indicates that investors react negatively to announcement of downgrade by asking for a
greater premium when using CDS for banks located in the downgraded country. The value of the coe cient
increases also significantly from 722 for the shortest window (from the announcement to 2 days after) to 3752
for the longest window (from 5 days before the announcement to 5 days after). Investors attach importance
to the nationality of the bank and attach even more importance when the window is large at the surrounding
of the event. So investors take into account the lower ability of governments in helping their banking sector.
This result is robust whatever the window is.
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Table 7: Model estimation with separation between Qualitative and Quantitative disclosure indexes
The full sample consists of 752 observations in 2011, 2012 and 2013. The dependent variables are the cumulative abnormal
spread changes over four di erent windows. Independent variables definitions are provided in paragraphe 3.3. They are all
present in the regressions. The variables Sovereign Disclosure and Global Disclosure are decomposed following their qualitative
and quantitative nature to check the robustness of the results. The OLS regressions are based on standard errors adjusted for
heteroskedasticity. In parentheses are the t- test values. ***, **,* indicate statistical significativity at the 1%,5% and 10% level
respectively.
CASC 0,+5 CASC 0,+5 CASC -5,+5 CASC -5,+5
Type Of Exposure Gross Net Gross Net
const -1468.12*** -1524.45*** -2728.71*** -2803.76***
(-15.62) (-15.64) (-14.93) (-14.78)
Qualitative Sovereign
Disclosure
-0.002 ***
(-5.07)
-179.37 ***
(-4.33)
-322.00 ***
(-4.18)
-321.14***
(-4.00)
Quantitative Sovereign
Disclosure
-297.38 ***
(-3.82)
-302.74 ***
(-3.64)
-619.43 ***
(-3.87)
-576.62***
(-3.56)
Qualitative Global
Disclosure
1386.63 ***
(12.48)
1453.85 ***
(12.49)
2615.81 ***
(12.019)
2717.87***
(12.19)
Quantitative Global
Disclosure
566.34***
(8.96)
584.03 ***
(9.04)
1075.64 ***
(8.91)
1101.68***
(8.79)
Relative Exposure 4920.15 *** 4970.59 *** 8556.38*** 8741.94***
(8.20) (8.15) (7.84) (7.65)
ICC Exposure -0.07 *** -0.07 *** -0.13 *** -0.14***
(-8.17) (-8.43) -(7.91) (-8.27)
Downgrade Exposure 0.01 *** 0.01 *** 0.02*** 0.02***
(6.67) (6.82) (6.38) (7.03)
Short Term Exposure 0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.03
(1.08) (-0.66) (1.23) (-0.43)
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Medium Term
Exposure
0.004 *
(1.72)
0.05
(1.55)
0.08 *
(1.79)
0.08
(1.30)
Long Term Exposure -0.003 * -0.01 -0.05 ** -0.02
(-1.87) (-0.56) (-2.03) (-0.65)
Domestic 80.80 129.33 2.77E+02 * 388.10**
(1.07) (1.50) (1.66) (2.10)
Eurozone 620.30 *** 649.29 *** 1190.88 *** 1205.38***
(11.86) (12.01) (11.55) (11.34)
ICC 3684.54 *** 3563.53 *** 6.66E+03 *** 6771.64***
(16.31) (14.98) (15.39) (14.73)
ICCxICC Exposure 0.003 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.33) (1.13) (0.77) (1.24)
Tier 1 -2.78E-06 *** -3.74E-06 *** -5.98E-06 *** -7.03E-06***
(-2.69) (-2.75) (-2.95) (-2.78)
RWA -3.36E-07 *** -3.07E-07 ** -6.11E-07 *** -7.36E-07***
(-3.17) (-1.95) (-3.01) (-2.65)
Non Performing Loans -2.98E-07 -1.78E-06 -9.51E-07 -1.97E-06
(-0.11) (-0.64) (-0.19) (-0.41)
R  0.66 0.65 0.66 0.65
Adjusted R  0.65 0.64 0.66 0.64
F(15. 477) 55.60 53.14 53.90 51.82
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
The relationship between ICC and the CDS spread reveals interesting results. The ICC variable has a
positive and significant relationship with the evolution of the CDS spreads. This result shows that investors
do take into account the nationality of the bank in their calculation of the spread. The fact of being located
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in one of the four countries in crisis is interpreted as an increase of the probability of default of the bank
and can be explained by the diminishing capacity of governments of those countries to ensure the potential
bailing out of banks in trouble. The fact that investors take care about the nationality of the bank seems
to be confirmed by the positive impact of Eurozone on the CASCs: ceteris paribus, a downgrade influences
more the spread of a bank if it is in the Eurozone than if it is not. This result is robust whatever the window
is. It tends to show that investors worried about the financial stability of Eurozone and the cohesion of
banking system in Eurozone.
Concerning the risk of the bank, the Tier 1 variable’s coe cient is generally negative and significant. In
average, the higher the Tier 1, the more the CDS spread is reduced when a downgrade happens, ceteris
paribus. This result is consistent with the recommendations of Basel III capital agreement. Investors tend
to reward banks with the highest Tier 1 at the downgrade announcement, as Tier 1 is a source of a bank’s
financial strength. The RWA is never significant. Such result is interesting in a sense that investors do not
react to the RWA and they largely react to Tier 1. The absence of reaction can be interpreted as RWA does
not provide enough information to investors. At last, the Non Performing Loans variable does not present a
significant influence on the cumulative abnormal CDS spread change.
5.4 Robustness tests
We rerun our main regressions, considering CASC 0,+5 and CASC -5,+5, in order to check the robustness
of our results. First, we test the robustness of our results by introducing control variables of macroeconomic
stability: the VIX and the CISS. The VIX is the CBOE (Chicago Board Options Exchange) Volatility Index,
measuring the market expectations of short-term volatility as they appear in the S&P 500 Index options
prices. The VIX reflects the market perception of financial volatility, and can be used as a proxy of macro-
financial stability. The CISS is the Composite Indicator of Systematic Stress elaborated by the ECB. Its
aim is to measure the systemic stress present on the financial system. Results are given in table 8. The
conclusion of this analysis is that our results do not rely on the macroeconomic stability, as showed by the
stability of our results.
The, we rerun the model for two sub-samples: depending on the SIFI (Systemically Important Financial
Institution, as given by the Financial Stability Board) or not SIFI nature of the banks. The results are quite
similar, but some interesting di erences appear. First, the tier one is not significant for the SIFI banks, as
if investors were sure of the resilience of these banks and do not car about their level of required capital.
Second, the role played by Sovereign Disclosure is not significant for non SIFI banks, as if when the risk
is important, a strategy of transparency can not reassure investors. Then, we try to see if being or not a
bank located in a In Crisis Country (ICC) changes the results, following Delatte et al. (2014). The results
are robust. We also regress the model depending in the year of the event. We regress the model for the
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2011 event and then for the 2012 and 2013 events. The results are robust, but the Sovereign Disclosure
is significant only for the first period: we can assume that the transparency mattered especially at the
beginning of the crisis, when investors were worried and when information about exposure were particularly
scarce. Moreover, considering the nature of our sample, we estimate the cluster-robust estimator, clustering
either by the country of the bank (following for instance Neratina et al, 2014) or by the date of the event
(to prevent the problem of event-date clustering, emphasized for instance by Kalori and Pynnönen, 2010).
Our results are robust (They are available upon request).
6 Conclusion
The article provides results on the relationship between disclosure and financial market stability. The results
tend to outline some interesting results about the impact of disclosure. We can see that a too broad measure
of disclosure, too global, has not the expected e ect and does not participate to the reduction of CDS
spreads. This finding is consistent with a large section of the empirical and theoretical literature which
advocate for less disclosure (see Coates 2007 for instance). This phenomenon can be also interpreted by
the fact that the macroeconomic situation of each of the participating bank was not as stable as it could
have been a couple of years before. The global disclosure may not be rewarded during crisis or when there
is an unstable perspective but it will require further research to understand more globally the impact of
global disclosure on the CDS market. Although, targeted disclosure, information about sovereign risk do
decrease the CDS spreads. As mentioned before the literature around disclosure is dual sided about the
impact of disclosure on stability. We see in our results a negative correlation between targeted disclosure,
here sovereign disclosure, and the evolution of the CDS spreads compared to the evolution of the CDS index
in most of the cases. Targeted disclosure is in fact participating to market stability during a period of
unstable macroeconomic environment. The results found here also tend to corroborate the critics emitted
during the European sovereign debt crisis. It looks like that being a bank located in the Eurozone tend to
significantly increase the volatility of the CDS spreads. The recent crisis has proven that the Eurozone has
been weakened due to the crisis and so a bank located in one of the countries: the fact of being located in
countries in crisis seems to increase the probability of default for those banks. Those banks are holding a
large amount of sovereign debts that were getting closer to default after each downgrade: the risk of default
was then transferred from the country to the subsequent bank. The contagious e ect found by Arnold (2012)
is here verified. Meanwhile, on the other hand the exposure to countries in crisis does not seem to influence
positively the CDS volatility. These findings are a key for further researches in two di erent macroeconomics
situations: in a growing macroeconomics situation and in another crisis to corroborate the results. It would
also be extremely pertinent to develop some theoretical research on the impact of disclosure and the volatility
of CDS spreads, in either stable and unstable environment.
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Table 8 : Model estimation including VIX and CISS
The full sample consists of 752 observations in 2011, 2012 and 2013. The dependent variables are the cumulative abnormal
spread changes over four di erent windows. Independent variables definitions are provided in paragraphe 3.3. They are all
present in the regressions. The variables VIX and CISS are included to check the robustness of the results. The OLS regressions
are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. In parentheses are the t- test values. ***, **,* indicate statistical
significativity at the 1%,5% and 10% level respectively.
CASC 0,+5 CASC 0,+5 CASC -5,+5 CASC -5,+5
Type Of Exposure Gross Net Gross Net
const -1331.15***
(-10.41)
-1376.08***
(-10.51)
-2486.21***
(-10.43)
-2542.36***
(-10.71)
Sovereign Disclosure -279.99***
(-4.20)
-300.24***
(-4.33)
-553.53***
(-4.40)
-559.40***
(-4.30)
Global Disclosure 1684.35*** 1750.62*** 3162.77*** 3222.53***
(12.37) (12.58) (12.41) (12.48)
Relative Exposure 4399.68*** 4522.08*** 7713.44*** 7965.36***
(7.91) (8.13) (7.68) (7.91)
ICC Exposure -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.12*** -0.13***
(-7.65) (-7.50) (-7.39) (-7.34)
Downgrade Exposure 0.01*** 0.009*** 0.02 *** 0.02***
(5.95) (5.51) (5.60) (5.31)
Short Term Exposure 0.10*** 0.06 0.18*** -0.06
(3.05) (-0.54) (2.91) (-0.72)
Medium Term
Exposure
0.01
(0.42)
-0.06 *
(1.76)
0.03
(0.55)
0.11*
(1.74)
Long Term Exposure -0.06*** -0.03 -0.11*** -0.03
(-4.15) (-1.13) (-3.83) (-0.84)
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Domestic 690.84 *** 528.68*** 1019.71*** 863.05***
(5.26) (3.456) (4.42) (3.04)
Eurozone 582.40*** 605.86*** 1094.51*** 1125.97***
(10.31) (10.42) (10.49) (10.51)
ICC 3794.50*** 3914.81*** 6932.73*** 7046.84***
(16.36) (17.16) (16.05) (16.32)
ICCxICC Exposure 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.01
(0.36) (0.29) (0.19) (0.53)
Tier 1 -1.69E-06 -1.86E-06 -4.04E-06 -3.62e-06
(-0.88) (-0.98) (-1.23) (-1.51)
RWA -1.66E-07 -9.82E-08 -1.89E-07 -1.33e-07
(-0.78) (-0.46) (-0.54) (-0.35)
Non Performing Loans -8.61E-07 -7.59E-07 -1.44E-06 -1.41e-06
(-0.34) (-0.27) (-0.30) (-0.27)
VIX -0.15 -0.17 0.02 -0.01
(-0.20) (-0.22) (0.02) (-0.008)
CISS 27.41 19.63 89.35 -0.01
(0.48) (-0.34) (0.81) (0.49)
R  0.65 0.63 0.63 0.63
Adjusted R  0.64 0.62 0.62 0.61
F(15. 477) 50.80 48.57 45.89 45.20
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
26
References
Acharya, V., I. Drechsler, and P. Schnabl (2014). A pyrrhic victory? bank bailouts and sovereign credit risk.
The Journal of Finance 69 (6), 2689–2739.
Acharya, V., T. Eisert, C. Eufinger, and C. Hirsch (2015). Real e ects of the sovereign debt crisis in europe:
Evidence from syndicated loans.
Akhigbe, A. and A. D. Martin (2008). Influence of disclosure and governance on risk of us financial services
firms following sarbanes-oxley. Journal of Banking & Finance 32 (10), 2124–2135.
Alexandre, H. and T. Wang (2015). Are bank credit risks linked to sovereign credit risks? evidence in the
euro area. Working Paper DRM, University Paris Dauphine.
Annaert, J., M. D. Ceuster, P. V. Roy, and C. Vespro (2013). What determines euro area bank cds spreads?
Journal of International Money and Finance 32, 444–461.
Arnold, I. J. M. (2012). Sovereign debt exposures and banking risk in the current eu financial crisis. Journal
of Policy Modelling 34, 906–920.
Baumann, E. and U. Nier (2004). Disclosure, volatility, and transparency: An empirical investigation into
the value of bank disclosure. Federal Reserve Bank New York, Economic Policy Review 10, 31–46.
Bischof, J. and H. Daske (2013). Mandatory disclosure, voluntary disclosure, and stock market liquidity:
Evidence from the eu bank stress tests. Journal of Accounting Research 51 (5), 997–1029.
Bruyckere, V. D., M. Gerhardt, G. Schepens, and R. van der Vennet (2013). Bank/sovereign risk spillovers
in the european debt crisis. Journal of Banking and Finance 37 (12), 4793–4809.
Coates, J. C. (2007). The goals and promise of the sarbanes–oxley act. Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives 21 (1), 91–116.
Cordella, T. and E. Yeyati (1998). Public disclosure and bank failures. International Monetary Fund Sta 
Papers 45 (1).
Cordella, T. and E. Yeyati (2002). Financial opening, deposit insurance, and risk in a model of banking
competition. European Economic Review 46 (3), 471–485.
Delatte, A., M. Gex, and A. Lopez-Villavicencio (2012). Has the cds market influenced the borrowing cost
of european countries during the sovereign crisis? Journal of International Money and Finance 31 (3),
481–497.
Ellahie, A. (2012). Capital market consequences of e.u. bank stress tests. LSE working paper .
27
Farvaque, E., C. Refait-Alexandre, and S. Dhafer (2011). Corporate disclosure: A rewiew of its (direct and
indirect) benefits and costs. International Economics 128, 5–32.
Frolov, M. (2007). Why do we need mandated rules of public disclosure for banks? Journal of Banking
Regulation Vol. 8 (2), 177–191.
Grammatikos, T. and R. Vermeulen (2012). Transmission of the financial and sovereign debt crises to the
emu: Stock prices, cds spreads and exchange rates. Journal of International Money and Finance 31 (3),
517–533.
Hull, J., M. Predescu, and A. White (2004). The relationship between credit default swap spreads, bond
yields and credit rating announcements. Journal of Banking & Finance 28 (11), 2789–2811.
Kolari, J. and S. Pynnonen (2010). Event study testing with cross-sectional correlation of abnormal returns.
Review of Financial Studies 23 (11), 3996–4025.
Longsta , F., J. Pan, L. Pedersen, and K. Singleton (2007). How sovereign is sovereign credit risk? NBER
Working Paper (No. 13658).
MacKinlay, A. (1997). Event studies in economics and finance. Journal of Economic Literature 35 (1), 13–39.
Morgan, D. P., S. Peristiani, and V. Savino (2014). The information value of the stress test and bank opacity.
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 46 (7), 1479–1500.
Neretina, E., S. Cenkhan, and J. de Haan (2014). Banking stress test e ects on returns and risks. DNB
Working Paper (No. 419).
Norden, L. and M. Weber (2004). Informational e ciency of credit default swap and stock markets: The
impact of credit rating announcements. Journal of Banking & Finance 28 (11), 2813–2843.
Petrella, G. and A. Resti (2013). Supervisors as information producers: Do stress tests reduce bank opaque-
ness? Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (12), 5406–5420.
Tadesse, S. (2006). The economic value of regulated disclosure: Evidence from the banking sector. Journal
of Accounting and Public Policy 25 (1), 32–70.
Vauhkonen, J. (2011). The impact of pillar 3 disclosure requirements on bank safety. Journal of Financial
Services Research 41 (1-2), 37–49.
28
